One of the nation's most esteemed scholars of US foreign policy writing about the greatest debacle in the post--Cold War era makes for an incredible book. Employing extensive interviews with all the principal players, memoirs, and exhaustive documentary research, Leffler (emer., Univ. of Virginia) overturns many myths about George W. Bush. The author is quite generous and favorable to Bush, demonstrating that despite other commentators' claims, the president was cautious, discerning, and reluctant to go to war. Still, Leffler ultimately concludes that Bush bears responsibility for the dysfunctional advising structure and his refusal to provide the necessary leadership over warring hostile personages and offices. The most egregious offender was the pompous Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who grabbed power, employed it ineffectively, and imposed his narrow perspective on the war and postwar operations. However, many others who engaged in intra-agency rivalries were also at fault. This is a classic study of how not to do policymaking, and future leaders can gain immeasurable value from attention to this failed process. In the vast literature on the Iraq tragedy, this incisive, readable book stands above all others. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Lower-division undergraduates through faculty; professionals. --Joe P. Dunn, Converse University

Sober overview of the complicated reasoning behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its disastrous ramifications, which still reverberate today. Veteran historian Leffler, who won the Bancroft Prize for his 1993 book, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War, builds his latest political study around interviews with participants designed "to supplement and complement the written record, not replace it." He closely examines the actions and thinking of George W. Bush and his so-called Vulcans--as Condoleezza Rice's group of foreign policy advisers were called--after the events of 9/11 prompted a "war of terror" that was conducted without adequate preparation and planning, especially in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. While much of this territory has been covered before, Leffler adds useful contextual detail, beginning with a detailed biography of Saddam Hussein, who was especially brutal in his political and military tactics--e.g., gassing his own people. Because of Hussein's known lying about his buildup of biological and chemical weapons, support of terrorism, hatred of Zionism, and general grandiose ambitions for a pan-Arab unity led by himself, the U.S. was already deeply wary of his regime before 9/11. The author asserts that paying close attention to Hussein's possible possession of weapons of mass destruction was a fairly reasonable reaction to his proven heinous behavior, and the Americans, shaken by the inability to prevent 9/11, were keen to remove any chances another such attack could happen again. Leffler emphasizes Bush's reliance on "coercive diplomacy" to pressure Hussein to destroy his weapons, and he shows that the president did not necessarily want to go to war. Ultimately, however, he was ill-served by his subordinates, especially Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who fostered a poisonous, backbiting atmosphere among colleagues. Not groundbreaking but Leffler effectively demonstrates the nuances involved in the "dilemmas of statecraft." Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.